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I. Introduction

thereby, reducing interest tax shields. An equity-fordebt exchange may therefore represent a trade-off beEquity for debt exchanges have recently experitween
near term accounting benefits and longer term
enced a surge in popularity. Before 1981, such trans-

cash flow costs. An important question about these
actions occurred occasionally, but because of a change
transactions
is how this trade-off affects the value of
in the tax laws, these transactions have since taken on

the firm.
new prominence. The financial press suggests
that
purpose of this paper is to address that question
there are two main reasons for undertaking anThe
ex-

by examining
the risk-adjusted returns of exchanging
change: (1) to increase the current period earnings
per
firms
around
the transaction date. We begin by disshare and (2) to improve the balance sheet by reducing

debt.' The technique has been used by a broadcussing
cross-the valuation implications of equity-for-debt
exchanges,3 followed by a description of the sample of
section of firms, and in certain cases, the earnings
exchanging
generated by the exchange have represented most
of firms, and the empirical methods. Finally,
we present the results of the analysis and concluding
the earnings reported for the period.' These transac-

tions are not without cost, since the firm may remarks.
be re-

placing a low cost source of funds with equity, and

II. Valuation Implications

The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and sugA review
gestions of the editor. Robert Taggart. and those of two anonymous

of the press announcements of exchanges

suggests that some managers undertook these transac-

referees.

tions because of the immediate accounting changes
that occur in the income statement and balance sheet,

'See for example [1].

specifically, an increase in earnings for the current

2The Tax Reform Act of 1984 eliminated the favorable treatment of

gains in an exchange; consequently, the transactions have been used 3Finnerty [8] provides a description of the institutional and tax details of
exchanges.
infrequently since July 1984
18
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period and a reduction in financial leverage. As with athe firm were perceived as permanently reducing fidiscount bond repurchase, the gain on the transactionnancial leverage. An upward revaluation would result
is the total amount of the discount on the bonds retired,
from the perception that the firm was using the exand this gain may be reported as earnings.4 In the case
change as part of a profitable bond-refunding strategy.
of U.S. Steel, the gain amounted to $87 million in the The market's perception of the motivation for the
second quarter of 1982, turning an $83 million loss
exchange is crucial in the revaluation, and it is likely
into a profit of $4 million for the quarter. The balance
that this perception would be based upon information
sheet changes result from the reduction in the principal
conveyed by the characteristics of each exchange. For
amount of outstanding debt, and an increase in equity
example, a firm using the exchange as part of a refundby the amount of the newly issued shares plus the gain.
ing strategy could signal this information to the market
While the financial press has focused on the benefiby issuing debt prior to the announcement of the ex-

cial accounting effects of equity for debt exchanges,
change, or by using a combination of cash and equity
the capital market reaction to an exchange might be
in the exchange.8 In contrast, a firm that wished to use
positive or negative, depending on the perceived pur-the exchange to reduce financial leverage would be
pose of the transaction.5 For example, certain firms
expected to use only equity in payment for the bonds,
may have used the exchange to effect a permanent
since the use of cash would moderate the impact on
change in financial leverage, and in those cases, recent
leverage.
findings would suggest a permanent negative revalu-

III.
ation of the shares. Studies of capital structure change

The Sample of Equity for Debt

Exchanges
have documented a positive relationship between the
change in equity value and the direction of the change The sample of transactions for this study includes
in financial leverage,6 with the change attributed to equity
a
for debt exchanges in 1981 and 19829 by firms
tax effect, a wealth transfer, or an information effect.
meeting the following criteria:

Other firms used an exchange as part of a bond (i) the firm's stock returns be available in the
refunding strategy, in response to the Bankruptcy Tax
Act. Kalotay [9] demonstrated that the profitability of

CRSP daily returns file. This limited the sam-

ple to NYSE and ASE listed firms.
a refunding decision depends on the avoidance or de-(ii) the equity for debt exchange had an identifiable
announcement date.
ferral of any associated tax liability. Following the
change in the tax law, deferral was permitted when the (iii) no other major firm-specific events occurred
bonds were exchanged for equity. Thus, a profitable
within 20 trading days of the exchange.10
equity for debt exchange might be expected to have a

positive impact on the value of the firm's equity.7
8The use of cash in the exchange would provide a non-ambiguous signal
The announcement of an exchange could therefore
that the firm was not altering its capital structure by the full amount of
lead to differing valuation effects across companies,
the exchange, since the use of cash would moderate the desired effect.
with the direction of the change determined by the
We recognize that it is not necessarily true that the use of cash indicates
that the firm will be refunding debt, however, we contend that this is a
market's perception of the motivation for the transaclikely situation because of the favorable tax treatment of exchanges with
tion. A permanent negative revaluation would result if
regard to refunding. A possible alternative explanation for the use of
cash would be when a firm was using the exchange as part of a sinking
fund management program.

4There has long been concern over the treatment of the profit when firms
retire discount bonds. The SEC has been concerned that the discount

was being reported as ordinary rather than extraordinary income. Gener- 9The first exchange, by Quaker Oats, was completed in August 1981.
ally, the gain is extraordinary if the scheduled maturity date is more than Our sample period thus extends from August 1981 through December

one year beyond the repurchase date.

1982.

5Finnerty [8] presents an extensive analysis of the valuation conse- '0Two investments banking firms provided us with internal listings of
quences of equity for debt exchanges, providing the insights of anall exchange transactions. From these lists, more than 200 transactions

investment banker. A number of his observations were helpful in the were initially identified. All of the original press announcements were
read, and The Wall Street Journal Index was reviewed for 50 days
development of this section.
before and after the announcement date to be certain that each transac-

tion met these criteria. Firms were excluded when any confounding
6See, for example Dann [5], Masulis [11], Mikkelson [15], and Verevent occurred within that window. In a number of cases, the exchange
maelen [19].
was announced along with the periodic earnings. This was a primary
cause of sample shrinkage. Examples of other confounding events in7The net effect is confounded by any negative valuation impact associat-cluded product liability litigation for Esmark, and an oil discovery by
ed with the reduction in long-term debt resulting from the transaction. Phillips Petroleum.
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The Wall Street Journal Index and the original
Wall
Exhibit
1. Size Distribution of Transactions (Equity
Exchanged as a Percentage of Outstanding Equity)

Street Journal articles were reviewed to make certain

that each of the transactions met the preceding three

S

criteria. These selection criteria resulted in a final sam-

N

S > .10 2

ple of 108 equity-for-debt exchanges undertaken by 90
firms. In Exhibit 1, we present the relative size distribution of the transactions, where size is the number of

.10 > S > .08 2 Maximum 14.80%
.08 > S > .06 3 Minimum .03
.06 > S > .04 6 Mean 2.10
.04 > S > .02 26

shares exchanged as a proportion of the total shares

.02 > S > .00 69

outstanding. The cross-sectional variation is apparent.
Three event-related dates were identified for each

108

transaction. The date the first announcement of the

exchange appeared in The Wall Street Journal is referred to as the announcement date. The second date of

and the ordinary least squares coefficient estimates are
denoted as a and :. The prediction error for security j

interest is the date when the new shares were registered

with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), on day t is defined as
defined as the filing date. Typically, the filing date

preceded the announcement date by one or more tradPEj, = Rjt - (a& + /jRm),
ing days. Finally, the pricing date is the day when the
firm actually issues the new shares to the investment where
banker. The terms of the transaction are established by
Rj, = the rate of return for security j on day t, and
the market prices on that day, and any uncertainty

(1)

R,, = the value-weighted return for the market

about the transaction is resolved then. The pricing date

portfolio on day t.

was generally the last of the three dates, although there
were some cases where it was coincident with the
announcement date.

For each trading day t, the average prediction error is

In order to identify those firms in the sample using
the exchange as part of a bond refunding program, we

N,

PE, = /Nt, PE,,

searched the Compuserve data base for new bond is-

j=1

(2)

sues during the period January 1, 1981 through June
where
30, 1983. This procedure allowed us to partition the

sample into 34 exchanges where there was a new bond

issue (the refunding group) and 74 exchanges whereN, = the number of securities with a prediction

there was no new issue. The sample was further partitioned on the basis of the use of cash in the transaction.
Transactions in which cash was used were included in

error defined on day t.

The cumulative average prediction error through day T

the refunding group. T The selection criteria resulted in

a final sample of 43 refunding exchanges, and 65 nonrefunding exchanges.

is defined as
T

CPE,

IV. Methodology

E PE,.

t= -50

(3)

Security returns are examined over an event period The cumulative average prediction error over the inter-

from 50 trading days before the announcement dateval from t, to t, inclusive is
(day 0) to 50 trading days after. The market model was

estimated over the period from t= - 200 to t = - 51,

t2

CPEtl,2 = PE,

(4)

t =t
"The basis for this partition was the similarity in abnormal returns for
the two groups. The 12 firms that used cash as part of the exchange had
abnormal returns equal in magnitude and significance to those of the 33
firms that issued new bonds. This similarity existed despite the fact that
only two firms (three exchanges) were in both groups. To the extent that
we were unable to identify firms that repurchased shares with bank
borrowings, out partition is less than perfect.

where the interval has length L = t - t, + 1, reflecting
the requirement that t2 does not precede t,.

The analysis of the significance of the PEj,'s and

their cumulation over defined intervals uses the meth-

odology of Dodd and Warner [7]. The test-statistic
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employed is the mean standardized cumulative predicerrors (PE) and the mean cumulative prediction erro

(CPE) for event days - 50 through + 50 for both t
tion error. For a specific interval Lj = Tj,...,T2j, this

test-statistic is

refunding and non-refunding groups. Exhibit 3 is a p

SCPEj= - (PEj/s)/VT2 - T,j + (5)
1.
t=Tlj

of the respective CPE's over the same period. The tes
statistics for various intervals around the announcement date are reported in Exhibit 4. Two aspects of the

CPE patterns are notable: the overall differences
throughout the interval, and the similarity of the patterns at the initial event (day 0) for the transaction.

sjt is defined as

sj, s I+1/Dj +

(Rmt_ Rm)2 ' /2
D.

(6)

, (Rt' ,.-R)J2

t'=l

where s2 is the residual variance for security j from
the market model regression,

Dj is the number of observations during the
observation period,
Rmt is the rate of return on the market index for

day t,
Rm is the mean rate of return on the market

index during the estimation period, and
Rmt, is the rate of return on the market index for

day t' of the estimation period.
For a portfolio of N securities, the test-statistic is
N

Z= s SCPE//- N, (7)
j=l

which follows a unit normal distribution since each

A. Overall CPE Patterns

The differences in the CPE patterns for the tw

groups are striking, with a total accumulation for t

refunding group of 7.39% on day 50 compared

- 1.03% for the non-refunding group. In addition, t

CPE for the non-refunding group is negative dur

most of the 101-day period of analysis, while that f
the refunding group is mostly positive and generall

increasing past day -20. The post-event accumu

tion for the refunding group was statistically signi
cant for all except the shortest of the intervals repor
The results reported here are consistent with our ear

discussion, i.e., there is a positive price effect for t
refunding group, and no significant post-event valu
ation effect for the non-refunding group.
B. Announcement Period Effects

Despite the differences in overall results, the reac-

tion to the initial event is similar for the two groups. I

each case the test-statistics in Exhibit 4 are significan

standardized prediction error, PEjt/sjt, is assumed to and negative during the two-day event interval. Th

follow a unit normal distribution in the absence of

difficulty and importance of identifying the announce

abnormal performance. The interval over which SCPEj ment date with precision in any event study is we

is calculated, Lj, can be of equal or different lengthknown,'3 and is especially pertinent here since ther
across securities. When the interval is equal, we ana-were three key dates for each exchange, and any uncer

lyze security performance for all firms relative to one tainty over the terms of the exchange was not finally
of the three event dates and refer to this as the 'event resolved until the pricing date. Generally, the initi

day' technique. The event day analysis may lead to press announcement followed the SEC filing by one o
cross-sectional inconsistency because of the multiplemore days, creating the possibility that informatio
event dates, and the fact that uncertainty about theabout the transaction was available prior to the pre
transaction is resolved over intervals that vary fromdate. In order to avoid this potential measuremen

firm to firm.12 In order to overcome this inconsistency,problem, we define day 0 as the earliest of the press
we also utilize an 'event interval' analysis, where Lj is filing date, and examine prediction errors on days - 1

firm specific.

V. Results

and 0.

In Exhibit 5, we report the results of this phase of the

analysis, and present the distributions of two-day
CPE's for both groups. The CPE for the refunding
In Exhibit 2, we report the daily mean prediction
group is - 1.29% (test-statistic -4.53), while that for

'2For example, with the event day (day 0) defined as the announcement
date, at day +3 some firms will be past their pricing day while others
'3See Brown and Warner [3].
will not yet have reached that date.

22

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT/AUTUMN 1985

Exhibit 2. Daily Prediction Errors (PE) and the Cumulative Prediction Errors
(CPE) Around the First Announcement (Day 0) of Equity for Debt Exchanges
Non-Refunding Firms Refunding Firms
Day

PE

CPE

Day

PE

CPE

-50 -0.00150 -0.00150 -50 0.00213 0.00213
-40 -0.00248 - 0.01200 -40 -0.00027 - 0.00569
- 30 0.00062 -0.00500 - 30 0.00202 0.00227
- 20 - 0.00095 -0.00324 - 20 0.00006 0.00098
-10 -0.00311 -0.00594 -10 0.00461 0.01575

- 9 - 0.00096 - 0.00498 - 9 - 0.00222 0.01353
- 8 -0.00211 -0.00719 - 8 -0.00506 0.00847
- 7 - 0.00057 - 0.00776 - 7 0.00285 0.01132
- 6 -0.00296 -0.01072 - 6 -0.00252 0.00880
- 5 0.00453 - 0.00637 - 5 0.00460 0.01340
- 4 0.00238 - 0.00399 -4 - 0.00032 0.01308

- 3 -0.00132 - 0.00531 - 3 0.00086 0.01394
- 2 -0.00347 - 0.00878 - 2 - 0.00137 0.01256
-1 -0.00002 -0.00880 - - 0.00432 0.00824
0 -0.00599 -0.01479 0 -0.00864 -0.00040
1

-0.00496

-0.01975

1

0.00062

0.00022

2 - 0.00317 - 0.02292 2 0.00222 0.00244
3 0.00189 -0.02103 3 -0.00054 0.00190
4 -0.00213 -0.02316 4 0.00274 0.00464

5 -0.00121 -0.02437 5 0.00202 0.00665
6

0.00140

-0.02296

6

0.00291

0.00956

7 0.00166 -0.02131 7 0.00280 0.01236
8 -0.00042 -0.02173 8 0.00667 0.01903

9 0.00226 -0.01947 9 0.00521 0.02425
10 - 0.00428 - 0.02375 10 0.00108 0.02533
20 0.00054 -0.01849 20 0.00162 0.03682
30 -0.00145 -0.01556 30 0.00219 0.05238
40 -0.00256 -0.00869 40 0.00275 0.05464
50 -0.00095 -0.01026 50 0.00187 0.07394

the non-refunding group
is effects,
-0.6% (test-statist
supply
tax effects,

-2.32), and the distributions
CPE's holders,
for the
classesof
ofthe
security

formation
effects.
In respec
this s
groups are similar with 67%
and 63%
negative,
and indirect
identify
tively. Of the 108 transactions,
70 tests
wereto
associate

ly caused
the errors.
decrease
in v
with negative event interval
prediction
These

Supplyof
Effect.
A possible
results provide strong evidence
the negative
com
cess
pattern
observe
mon stock price reaction
to returns
the initial
exchange
an
nouncement. This result
might be
expected discus
for th
pressure
hypothesis
and recently,
by lever
Asq
group using the exchange[10],
to reduce
its financial
asserts
that
ne
age, but it is puzzling forhypothesis
the refunding
group
which
had such a strong positive supply/demand
price effect in the
imbalance
post-eve
to be sold at a discou
period. For that group,shares
the announcement
causes
discount is
positive
functi
brief but significant discontinuity
in athe
positive
tren
of the CPE's. This result
raisesfor
a question
about th
Equity
debt exchanges
h
to secondary
distributions;'4
cause of the similar negative
responses
to the an
nouncement for the two shares
groups.did cause a supply im

C. Analysis of the Results

'1Scholes reported the average pro

Several possible explanations
of
negative
returns
sample
to the
be 0.0216;
the average
pro
sample was
0.021. These includ
have been identified in previous
studies.
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Exhibit 3. Plot of the Cumulative Prediction Errors
for the Two Groups

.08

.06

0

cr

.04 -

w
C.)
z

0

Refunding Firm
.02

w
cr

a-

0

A

-.02 --

-50 -40 -30 -20 -10
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

10

20

30

40

50

DAYS AROUND EVENT
turns similar to that observed here might result.15
price pressure effect in studies of secondary issues and
Previous studies of the price pressure hypothesis
primary issues, respectively. The recent study by Ashave produced conflicting results. Neither Scholes
quith nor
and Mullins, however, reports a significantly

Marsh found evidence to support the existence
of relationship
a
negative
between the announcement day
returns and the size of the equity offering, evidence

'5Copeland and Weston [4], p. 327, discuss the price pressure hypotheconsistent with a price pressure effect.
sis, and present diagrams representing the shape of CPE patterns when
To test in
this hypothesis, we examined
price pressure exists. The diagrams are quite similar to the patterns

Exhibit 3.

the relation-

ship between the event interval cumulative prediction
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FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT/AUTUMN 1985

Exhibit 4. Test-Statistics for Various Intervals
Around the Earliest Event

Date (Day 0) Associated

with the Exchange
Non-Refunding Firms Refunding Firms
Interval t-statistic Interval t-statistic

-50 to 0 -1.117 -50 to 0 0.196
-25 to 0 -0.954 -25 to 0 0.059
-10to 0 -1.010 -10to 0 -1.584
- 5to 0 -0.613 - 5to 0 -2.035
- 1 to 0 -2.319 - 1 to 0 -4.529
1 to 5 -2.355 1 to 5 1.330
I to 10 -1.475 1 to 10 3.411
1 to 25 0.495 1 to 25 3.520
I to 50 -0.038 1 to 50 4.753

ined along with the comovement of returns on common
stock and senior securities for individual companies. 7

There was no evidence of a wealth transfer being asso-

ciated with equity for debt exchanges.
Transactions Costs. While transactions costs may
have contributed to the decline in value observed at the

announcement, they were not a major factor. The financial press reported transactions costs to be approxi-

mately 3% of the value of equity exchanged, and the
average percentage of equity exchanged in our sample
was 2.10%. These figures suggest that, on average,
transactions costs accounted for 0.0633% of the de-

cline in equity value. Even for the largest exchange
considered, in which 14.8% of the outstanding equity

was swapped, the implied valuation consequence is

only
0.444%.
error, and the relative size
of
each transaction. The
Effects.
Information
effects appear and,
two-day CPE was regressed Information
on the
size
variable,

the most likely
explanation
the negative reaction
following Scholes, on the natural
log
of for
size,16
for toboth

the announcement. Since
the transaction provided
the entire sample, and by refunding
sub-group.
In no
none
real a
economic
benefit to the firm, the
announcement
of the regressions was there
statistically
significant

provided
signal to the market.
Thosethe
relationship between the size
ofanaambiguous
transaction
and

CPE. This result is not consistent with the existence of

firms using an exchange to manufacture accounting

a price pressure effect.

earnings may have been perceived as having a limited
investment opportunity set, while those using the exchange as part of a sinking fund management program

Tax Effects. Mikkelson [15] has shown that the
reduction in tax shield is a factor that helps explain the
reduction in firm value associated with a decrease in

did not disclose that information at the announcement.

The net effect for each may have been a negative
financial leverage. The tax shield consequences of eqreaction
to the ambiguity surrounding the purpose of
uity-for-debt exchanges are affected by whether an
the transaction.
offsetting reissue occurs; thus, the tax effect should
differ from the refunding to the non-refunding group.

We interpret the combination of differing tax conse-VI. Summary
quences and similarity of announcement-period value Equity for debt exchanges became a popular transchanges as indirect evidence that the tax consequencesaction in mid-1981, with more than 200 firms using the

technique by the end of 1982. The financial press sugof equity for debt exchanges do not explain the decline
gested that firms were using the exchanges to enhance
earnings, and to reduce financial leverage ratios, thereest tax shields could explain the permanent decrease in

in value at the announcement. The lower level of inter-

value exhibited by the non-refunding group after the

by "cleaning up" their balance sheets. Investment

bankers attributed the sudden popularity of exchanges
to the passage of the Bankruptcy Tax Act, because that
Wealth Transfers. Although it seems unlikely

announcement.

that firms would undertake transactions that would

legislation foreclosed tax-deferred gains on bond refundings except when that refunding was accomleverage reducing equity for debt exchange has theplished through an exchange.

transfer wealth from stockholders to bondholders, a

potential to effect this transfer. A transfer in wealth This paper examined the impact of equity-for-debt
could result from lower expected bankruptcy costs, a exchanges on stockholder wealth by analyzing abnorchange in relative priorities of claims, and a reduction mal returns around the announcement of the exchange.
in variance of return to stockholders. To investigate theThe sample of 108 exchanges was partitioned into two
existence of a wealth transfer, the abnormal returns ongroups: those in which the bonds were refunded, and

senior securities of all exchanging firms were exam-those where there was no apparent refunding. The
'6The log of size was used because of the long right tail on the size
'7See reference [17] for a complete description of the analysis.

variable.
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Exhibit 5. Distribution of the Two-Day (-1,0) Common Stock Cumulative
Prediction Errors for the Sample of Equity for Debt Exchanges
Non-Refunding Refunding
CPE

N

%

N

%

CPE < -.08 0 0.00 2 4.65
< CPE < -.06 0 0.00 1 6.98

-.08
-.06

<

CPE

<

<

-.04

-.04

<

CPE

-.02

-.02

<

CPE

<

.00

.00

<

CPE

<

.02

4

13
24

6.15

.02

<

CPE

.04

<

CPE

.06

<

<
<

.04
.06

5
3

CPE

34.88

63.08

14

67.44

29

87.69

10

90.70

2

95.35

95.39
100.00
1

1

14

65

43

-

.0554
.0482-

97.67

100.00

24

Maximum
Minimum

11.63

10

41

16

2

26.15

.0653
.0957

Mean -.0060 (Z= -2.32) -.0129 (Z = -4.53)

firms that used the exchange as partFinancial
of a Economics
bond (March
refund1980), pp. 3-30.
ing program had cumulative abnormal
returns
of Governance: A
7. P. Dodd and J. B. Warner, "On Corporate

7.39% on day 50, compared to cumulative
abnormal
Study of Proxy Contests,"
Journal of Financial Economics

returns of - 1.03% for those firms that did not refund
the bonds.

Despite the difference in post-event price changes,
each group had significant negative abnormal returns

(April 1983), pp. 401-438.
8. J. D. Finnerty, "Stock for Debt Swaps and Shareholder
Wealth," Financial Management (Autumn 1985), pp.
5-17.

at the announcement of the exchange. Possible causes 9. A. J. Kalotay, "On the Advanced Refunding of Discounted
Debt," Financial Management (Summer 1978), pp.
of the negative reaction were examined, including a
14-18.
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